Abstract The paper gives ontologies in the Web Ontology Language (OWL) for Legal Case-based Reasoning (LCBR) systems, giving explicit, formal, and general specifications of a conceptualisation LCBR. Ontologies for different systems allows comparison and contrast between them. OWL ontologies are standardised, machinereadable formats that support automated processing with Semantic Web applications. Intermediate concepts, concepts between base-level concepts and higher level concepts, are central in LCBR. The main issues and their relevance to ontological reasoning and to LCBR are discussed. Two LCBR systems (AS-CATO, which is based on CATO, and IBP) are analysed in terms of basic and intermediate concepts.
the law and for legal reasoning are under active development (Breuker et al. 2002; Hoekstra et al. 2007 ) and there are references to ontologies for LCBR (Henderson and Bench-Capon 2001; Zeng et al. 2005) , there is little work which explicitly compares and contrasts ontologies for particular LCBR theories, thereby clarifying their essential components. To keep our discussion focussed and provide a basis for future analysis, we consider but two well-known LCBR systems-CATO (Ashley 1990; Aleven 1997) and Issue-based Prediction (IBP) Brüninghaus and Ashley 2003a; Brüninghaus and Ashley 2003b; Ashley and Brüninghaus 2003) . This allows us to see what elements the theories have in common as well as how common elements are interpreted differently. Moreover, we are not aware of LCBR ontologies which are designed to be web-based and as such support legal decision systems over the Internet. Our presentation addresses this.
In the course of modeling LCBR, we necessarily model legal cases. Arguably the raison d'être of modeling legal cases is to provide the instances on which to carry out LCBR (see Roth and Verheij 2004 for a related point). Indeed, clarification of the ontological commitments clarifies aspects of how reasoning is carried out. While there may be many aspects of cases which can be modeled, it is questionable that they are relevant unless they are used by some system of LCBR. A similar point can be made with respect to information retrieval of cases (Zeng et al. 2005) . In general, there ought to be some justification for the relevance of every part of a given case representation, even if the justification is with respect to hypothetical circumstances. In our view, modeling an aspect of cases implies that there is such a LCBR system, and such a system ought to be provided. While we do not consider these issues in their full complexity, our paper is a contribution to the discussion, using relatively simple models of cases in particular systems of LCBR.
As ontologies in OWL for LCBR are novel, we review basic motivations for an ontology in general and an ontology in OWL in particular. We then have an extensive analysis of two well-known LCBR systems: CATO (as presented using the argument schemes in Wyner and Bench-Capon (2007) and IBP Brüninghaus and Ashley (2003a, b) . The purpose of this analysis is to identify in these systems the key elements that are needed in the ontologies. However, the main focus of the paper is on developing the ontologies rather than how the components of the ontology are used in reasoning in LCBR. Having determined the key elements, we give an overview of the ontologies, indicating shared and distinct components as well as aspects of reasoning with respect to the ontologies. We close with comments on future work and conclusions.
Legal ontologies and Ontology Web Language (OWL)
In this section, we outline some of the main reasons for providing an ontology in OWL and using the ontology development tool Prote´ge´ (Uschold and Gruninger 1996; Noy and McGuinness 2000) , with particular reference to issues related to ontologies in the legal domain (Bench-Capon and Visser 1996; Kralingen et al. 1999 ).
An ontology is an explicit, formal, and general specification of a conceptualisation of the properties of and relations between objects in a given domain (Antoniou and van Harmelen 2004, p. 10; Antoniou et al. 2007 ). It defines a common vocabulary and organisation of information which can be shared, tested, and modified by researchers. An ontology makes assumptions explicit, separates domain knowledge (what are the objects?) from operational knowledge (how do we use the objects?), has a clear structure which supports analysis, is close to the expert knowledge that underwrites the formal ontology, and identifies structural units which can be reused in other ontologies. The limitations of the ontology are narrowly proscribed; the model represents a slice of a larger domain and limits the reasoning which can be done with respect to it. Finally, an ontology abstracts from the particular elements of the programming language of an implementation.
In providing an ontology, one gives classes of objects along with their properties such as the features, attributes, and restrictions that apply to the class. In addition, one specifies the relationships among the various objects of the ontology. The assumption is that the class of objects and the properties of the objects in the class fully and explicitly define the class. One specifies subclasses which inherit properties from the superclass while being further defined in their particular properties. An ontology describes the general classes; given instances of the classes, we have a knowledge base. One then applies rules such as production rules to elements of the knowledge base to support inference.
We have developed our ontologies in the Ontology Web Language (OWL) using the Prote´ge´ontology editor. OWL provides a machine readable ontology which can then be processed by applications; it is designed to underpin development of the Semantic Web. OWL provides a range of flavours, which are distinct in terms of the richness of the semantic information; each subsort is associated with a degree of logical expressiveness and associated computational properties. However, for our purposes, OWL Lite has been sufficient. The Prote´ge´ontology editing tool supports systematic development of an ontology. More importantly, Prote´ge´provides links to reasoners such that one can query the knowledge base, test one's proposed ontology for consistency, and generate inferred classes. Querying the knowledge base is to test whether a particular object has a given property or to output the set of objects with a given property or in a given relationship. Consistency means that there is a model in which the classes can all be instantiated and there are no instances with inconsistent properties. The inferred classes are those which are inferred from and so consistent with the ontology but which one has not explicitly stated and that may be desirable or undesirable classes. We have tested our ontology with the Pellet-1.3 reasoner, which found the ontology to be consistent.
1 Finally, Prote´ge´provides plugins to graphical tools which represent the ontology, which facilitates understanding and communication of the model.
An ontology can serve a range of purposes with respect to different applications; as the purpose varies, so too does the overt representation of the ontology. One purpose, already outlined, is to have a formal representation of a conceptualisation of a given domain. Once an ontology for a particular domain is expressed, it can be used to compare and contrast some other ontology for the same domain. In this case, the task is to align the ontologies so that one can clearly determine what elements correlate or are treated distinctly. Ontology alignment is a significant issue in and of itself which can be facilitated with an explicit ontology (Laera et al. 2006) . Indeed, this arose as a significant issue in this paper.
Another purpose is to provide an ontology which is deployed over the web (Antoniou and van Harmelen 2004 ). An ontology expresses a shared understanding of the terms of a domain and their relationships. Therefore, users who make use of the ontology can interact and use one another's data. For example, if users express their case bases in terms of the ontology expressed here, then, in principle, other users can search that case base automatically and over the Internet, querying it or integrating it into their own case base. As our primary focus in this paper is to develop the LCBR case base in the first instance, we have not explored these issues.
Yet, in providing an ontology only for deployment over the Internet, there is a somewhat different agenda, and the tools support a somewhat different, though related, representation. In particular, while we find it helpful to associate identifiers with our various objects, the identifiers are intrinsic to OWL ontologies written in an editor or deployed over the web since all objects automatically are assigned some identifier. Yet, as a means to represent our conceptualisation and to compare related theories, we find it helpful to make all such information extrinsic. By the same token, in developing software programs in general and legal knowledge systems in particular, one of the key early stages is a fully explicit, formal specification of the conceptual model (Jalote 2005; Kralingen et al. 1999 ). But, not every aspect of the specification is represented in the same way or as part of the same programming unit or module in the software program.
The purpose of our ontological analysis is to present a formal representation of the conceptualisation of several theories of LCBR, thus facilitating comparison and contrast between them. We make explicit elements which may otherwise be implicit in a web-deployment or in a program.
In the legal domain, the importance of ontology development was recognised in the mid-1990s as it became clear that the application of legal rules is often contingent on the satisfaction of a particular definition and as a range of problems with rule-based systems emerged (Bench-Capon and Visser 1996, p. 5, 10-11) . Our paper contributes in a novel way by providing an ontology for cases and case-based reasoning.
As a matter of scoping this paper, we focus on ontologies for LCBR rather than issues that arise in general with respect to ontological analysis per se. Our method is to analyse the ontologies of LCBR systems and select the central concepts as presented in them. The LCBR systems are designed to closely relate to legal experts' knowledge; indeed, CATO is designed as a learning support tool for law students. In this respect, these systems have already engineered expert knowledge. This justifies our claim to have an ontological representation of legal knowledge. In addition, more general issues which bear on ontological analysis or engineering expert knowledge are not addressed. For example, we do not consider alternative methodologies for the construction of an ontology such as Corcho et al. (2003) . Nor do we provide a comparison and contrast of different ontology editing tools other than Prote´ge´or inference engines other than Pellet-1.3; for our purposes, other tools and engines could have served as well, and we make no claims about the significance of one over the other.
Intermediate concepts
Intermediate concepts play a central role in LCBR. In this section, several general observations about intermediate concepts are outlined.
Intermediate concepts, particularly in legal reasoning, have been discussed in Ross (1957) , Lindahl (2004) , Ashley and Brüninghaus (2003) , and Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2006) . These are legal concepts such as ownership or pensioner which are implied by or given by base-level concepts of a language and which in turn imply or give higher-level concepts of the language. For example, being over 65 and being male (presuming them to be base-level concepts) may, in some legal systems, defeasibly imply being a pensioner; being a pensioner may in turn defeasibly imply being entitled to a free bus pass. (d) , where Q appears, together imply Rule (1), where Q does not appear, since material implication is transitive; the same points can be made for other pairs of rules in Rules (a)-(h) that imply a rule among Rules (1)-(10). Rules (a)-(h) are the axioms, while Rules (1)-(10) are theorems. Since this is so, the question is what role the proposition Q plays in reasoning beyond that of formally linking two rules? Moreover, what is the purpose of each of the pairs of rules such as (a) and (c) which together imply Rule (1)? As for our simple example, so for a more complex set of rules. Where there are many such rules, an apparent redundancy can be reduced by using the derived rules alone; in addition, given the derived rules, one need no longer carry out the steps to reason to the inferred rules. One approach to intermediate concepts such as Q is to suppose they are vehicles of inference which afford an economy of expression, for we need only state axioms from which we derive theorems (Ross 1957) . For example, the three rules (a)-(c) with Q as consequence combined with the three rules (d)-(f) with Q as antecedent imply nine rules (1)-(9); in general, given n rules with some proposition as consequent and m rules with that same proposition as antecedent, we have (n ? m) rules as axioms and (n * m) rules as theorems. Thus, it is more economical, in terms of a rule-base, to represent rules with the intermediate concept than without it.
Another reason to represent intermediate concepts is that they categorise the theorems into those which depend on the concept and those which do not; for example, Rules (1)-(9) depend on Q in a way that Rule (10) does not in that removing a rule with Q may have consequences in terms of which formulae are theorems. For example, if we remove Rule (d), then Rules (1)-(3) can no longer be inferred, leaving all other inferences intact. We can say that Rules (1)-(3) depend on Rule (d) and classify them as such. More intuitively, given facts such as has possession and has title (as P and R) which imply an intermediate concept such as ownership (as Q), a range of consequences related to ownership may follow such as has right to dispose and has right to transfer ownership (as S and T). Whether has right to dispose and has right to transfer ownership hold of some individual depends on whether ownership holds; these are rights which are categorised relative to ownership.
Considering maintenance of a rule-base, it is simpler and clearer to add or remove axioms than to add or remove theorems. Suppose a knowledge base contains either Rules (a)-(h) or Rules (1)-(11). Removing Rule (f) has a general consequence, namely, that Rules (7)-(9) can no longer be proved; indeed it may be the desired result to generally remove such theorems. On the other hand, removing any rule from Rules (1)-(11) has no general consequence; in this instance, the particular desirability of each rule must be evaluated.
We V^W^X] ]. However, primary legislation does not express the circumstances under which Q is said to hold. This is clarified by enabling legislation or case law decisions which further restrict or qualify the circumstances under which the intermediate concept holds. For example, the term incapacity for work in the sense relevant to induce the act (and so allow an individual to receive benefits) may only arise where certain enabling conditions hold such as the individual applying for the benefits has particular diseases, is under the care of a physician, and has not become ill due to his own misconduct. Where the enabling conditions do no hold, then incapacity for work in the relevant sense does not hold. If R, S, and T are the enabling conditions, then we can represent this as [[R^S^T] ? Q], assuming that if one of the enabling conditions does not hold, then Q does not hold. Thus, enabling legislation and case law are efforts to supply approximate necessary and sufficient conditions for the intermediate concept, while acknowledging that conditions could change. In practical terms, it is easier and quicker to amend enabling legislation than primary legislation, so allowing the legal system to be responsive while remaining true to the original legislative intent.
As we see in the following, approaches to LCBR, though similar in key respects, differ strongly in how intermediate concepts are represented and used to guide reasoning, as is appropriate for case-based reasoning.
Background on LCBR
There are a variety of approaches to implementations of LCBR, beginning with HYPO (Ashley 1990) , and subsequently developing into CATO (Aleven 1997) , IBP (Brüninghaus and Ashley 2003b) , CABARET (Rissland and Skalak 1991) , and BankXX (Rissland et al. 1996) . More theoretical work on LCBR appears in Prakken and Sartor (1996) , Bench-Capon (1997), and Sartor (2003) . For the purposes of our ontology, we have focussed on two approaches to LCBR, both based on CATO, where cases are associated with factors and parties which a factor favours. Therefore, we first present aspects of CATO; however, we do not present how we reason with the factors as in Aleven (1997) , where is it not explicitly and systematically presented. Instead, we present a system we refer to as AS-CATO (Wyner and Bench-Capon 2007), which does explicitly and systematically provide the means to reason with the factors. This discussion is followed by IBP. In each instance, we outline the key elements and reasoning processes as well as provide examples. However, as our focus is on the ontology, we emphasise the objects which are modeled, rather than all the details of how reasoning is carried out.
Our second system is IBP (Brüninghaus and Ashley 2003a, b) , which associates cases with issues, which is also based on CATO. However, it organises the Factor Hierarchy in a different way, taking higher-level factors to be intermediate concepts which have a boolean value and contribute to the final decision by logical inference.
This section is a detailed examination of LCBR systems for the purpose of identifying those elements and their relationships which are then expressed in LCBR ontologies.
Basic elements of CATO
In this section, we present the basic elements of CATO, outlining first the factors and Factor Hierarchy, then discussing the conception of the Factor Hierarchy in Aleven (1997) . In CATO, cases are comprised of factors, which are understood to be stereotypical fact patterns found in cases. Cases are compared with respect to factors they share. Abstract factors (i.e. intermediate concepts) and a Factor Hierarchy are used to reason about the significance of differences among cases and to organise arguments about cases.
2 Following the judicial standard of stare decisis, where similar cases are decided similarly, a current, undecided case is decided in view of previous decided cases which it is similar to.
Factors and factor hierarchy
In CATO, cases have factors and parties to cases. The factors are those features of a case which are used in making a decision in favour of one of the parties to the case. In addition to a name (which gives an idea of what the factor is about) and an ID (to facilitate reference), the factors are associated with that party of the case which the factor favours, either a D or a P. The factors are organised into a factor hierarchy so that one can reason about cases using an abstract factor. The factors are derived from legal works on trade secret law and concern trade secret misappropriation (Restatement of Torts First, Sec. 757 and the Uniform Trade Secret Act).
In Tables 2, 3 , 4, We have a partial list of the factors and Factor Hierarchy of Hierarchy of Aleven (1997, pp. 239-247) . 3 The lowest level factors are stereotypical collections of facts which legal experts agree influence the outcome. The lower level factors are organised below those higher level factors which that lower level factor lends support to. There are three sorts of factors, imposing a hierarchical relationship among the sorts from bottom-to-top: Base-level Factors (out of 26), Intermediate Legal Concerns (out of 11), and Legal Issues (out of 5 (Aleven 1997, pp. 44-45) . Reference is also made to strength relations between the factors in the hierarchy (Aleven 1997) ; however, as these have not been found to be relevant in other works on LCBR, we leave them aside (Chorley and Bench-Capon 2005a; Wyner and Bench-Capon 2007; Brüninghaus and Ashley 2003a, b) . In Table 2 , we list the Base-level Factors with associated ID (an identifier), the factor name (some description of the factor), the side the factor favours (P or D), and the factor parent (i.e. abstract factor). To say that the factor favours a D or P is to claim that the factor, if present in a case, favours a decision being made for that side. For example, if a case has F1, then there is a factor in favour of the case being decided for D. However, whether and how strongly a particular factor favours the decision for a party in a current case depends on the other factors of the case and how the current case factors counterbalance with the factors of a precedent case. In Table 3 , the Intermediate Legal Concerns are given with respect to ID, factor name, side, and factor parent. In Table 4 , the Legal Issues are provided according to ID and factor name. Note that Legal Issues do not have a side, for they can be decided for one side or the other. It is important to emphasise that the Factor Hierarchy in CATO is not an IS-A hierarchy; that is, the relation between a factor A and its parent B is not understood to be A is a B as in the class membership expression A penguin is a bird. Nor is the Factor Hierarchy an AND/OR goal tree (Aleven 1997, p. 46) . The term Parent in the tables simply means here the relative position of the factors in the hierarchy. Rather, the conceptual relation between factors is a notion of support or relevance, where lower level factors which are in favour a side (P or D) make it more or less likely that the higher level parent is supported or relevant in the case. For example, consider the Intermediate Legal Concept Questionable-Means, which if relevant in a case contributes to a decision in favour of P. For it to be relevant, it must be supported by Base-level Factors for the side of the plaintiff. If the case only contains Deception, a factor which favours P and has Questionable-Means as a parent, then Questionable-Means is more relevant to the final decision in favour of P. On the other hand, if the case only contains Info-Reverse-Engineered, which favours D, then Questionable-Means is less relevant to the final decision in favour of P.
Intermediate concepts in CATO
While Base-level factors, Intermediate Level Concerns, and Legal Issues are all factors, the Intermediate Level Concerns and Legal Issues are also referred to as issues, which are the intermediate legal concepts. Issues are a point of contention among arguers Aleven (1997, p.43) and Gordon and Karacapilidis (1997) ; issues are distinct from the facts, which presumably can be straightforwardly established and so not subject to dispute.
In CATO, the Factor Hierarchy has several purposes:
-To identify issues in a problem. For example, in a given case, must it be demonstrated that Info-Valuable for P. -To organise arguments by issues. For example, in a given case base, one can gather all those cases which bear on an issue such as Info-Valuable, then see what decisions are made relative to these cases. -To reason about the significance of differences among cases. For example, in a given case base, one might find several cases bearing on Info-Valuable, some of which decide the issue for P and others for D. One would want to reason about the differences between the cases which give rise to the different decisions.
In reasoning about differences among cases, several arguments are put forth about an issue (has a trade secret been violated?, have there been efforts to maintain (Aleven 1997, p. 22) . For example, a lawyer for P in a case which bears on Intermediate Legal Concern F102 Efforts-To-Maintain-Secrecy might cite several cases which bear on this issue and which were decided for P. The Base-level Factors are ''linked'' to Intermediate Legal Concerns such that an issue arises for consideration whenever there is a Base-level Factor related to the issue. The parent relation can be taken as this link. In addition, the Base-level Factors give (defeasible) support or opposition to the more abstract factor.
Cases are generally represented with Base-level Factors, though in some instances an issue might be represented in a case. For our purposes, cases are only represented with Base-level Factors since the issues can be understood to be determined by them. Furthermore, CATO's system does not reason with abstract factors as components of cases; that is, as we have pointed out above, issues are used to reason about cases, which in turn are given in terms of Base-level Factors.
AS-CATO
AS-CATO justifies a decision concerning a current, undecided case on the basis of precedent cases using argument schemes (AS) (Wyner and Bench-Capon 2007) which take into consideration partitions of factors between the cases. Abstract factors are used to provide exceptions to arguments to downplay distinctions.
In this section we discuss AS-CATO (Wyner and Bench-Capon 2007), which provides a particular analysis of how the factors and Factor Hierarchy are used to reason about a case using a case-base. We provide a sample of the factors and cases of this analysis. The factors used in this sample are F1, F2, F10, F12, F15, and F25. Table 5 provides a hypothetical case base, comprised of cases which are variations on Mason v. Jack Daniels, in which Jack Daniels, a major whiskey manufacturer, is D in a case where Mason, a private bar owner, is P; P is suing D for damages, claiming D stole his secret cocktail recipe and used it in a promotion. Each case contains factors which favour either P (P Factors) or D (D Factors). For example, the case Vanilla has the factor F15 Unique-Product, which favours P since P claims his product was unique, and the factor F1 Disclosure-in-Negotiations, Bench-Capon (1997) ; argument schemes are applied to the partitions of factors provided by the method. To give an idea of AS-CATO and a motivation for the ontology which underlies it, consider what it outputs. We query whether we should find for the P in a current and undecided case Bribe on the basis of precedents such as Vanilla found in the case base and given the factors in the cases. A sample output is along the following lines:
Bribe contains the factors: the product is unique, there was disclosure in negotiations, and an employee was bribed. Vanilla contains the factors: the product is unique, and there was disclosure in negotiations. That the product was unique and that the employee was bribed are reasons favouring the P in a case; that there was disclosure in negotiation is a reason favouring D in a case. Vanilla is a relevant precedent for Bribe because some factors for each side in Vanilla are also found in Bribe. Vanilla was found for P, which indicates that a product's uniqueness is preferred to disclosure in negotiations. Moreover, that an employee was bribed in Bribe but not in Vanilla is an additional factor favouring P in Bribe. As for Vanilla, more so for Bribe: we should find for P in Bribe on the basis of Vanilla.
The system can generate additional output for all other precedents which are relevant.
Reasoning in AS-CATO is based on the case comparison. While there are several components that go into the construction of the case comparison, the method itself which generates case comparisons is outside the scope of the ontology, though the requirements of the method inform the construction of the ontology. We outline the elements of the method in this section, considering how the case factors are partitioned and how the parties are associated with the case. We provide some examples as well as an example of the sort of reasoning AS-CATO supports. The chief reason we have adopted this method is because it is clear and supports argument about cases.
Case comparisons
Turning to the case comparisons, we take as CC (Current Case) a case in which the outcome is undecided and compare it to a PC (Precedent Case) in which the outcome is decided. For the moment, we discuss only those PCs decided for P since those which were decided for D can be determined in a similar fashion. Reasoning to a decision in the CC proceeds on the basis of analogy with the PC: as the factors in the PC led to a decision in favour of P and the CC is analogous to the PC, so the CC should also be decided in favour of P. However, the analogy depends on a counterbalancing interplay between the factors, the side each factor favours, and the side favoured in the decision in the PC. To clarify this, we next consider the partition of the factors.
Suppose that we compare the factors of a CC and a particular previously decided precedent case (PCi). The question is whether on the basis of the comparison we should decide CC for the same party (P or D) as PCi was decided. Given the factors of each case, we form partitions of the factors relative to the cases and the side which the factors favour. The partitions are labeled P1,…,P7, indicate how the partition biases a decision, and are set-theoretically defined relative to the sets of factors in the cases. For example, P1 and P2 represent what is similar in the cases, keeping in mind that the case was decided for P; in P3, we find those factors in CC which are not in PCi and which favour P. Other partitions are discussed below. We assume that a PCi can be a precedent for a CC only so long as these partitions are not empty. In Table 6 , we have seven partitions since we compare the intersection of the sets of factors relative to which side is favoured in CC or PCi. In Table 6 , we represent how the factors support a party and how that partition biases the decision in CC. We discuss each part.
We must clearly distinguish between how the partition is used in making a decision in the CC for or against a side and how the partition is defined. In the column labeled Set-Theoretic Definition, we pick one of the sides and determine the set-theoretic result of factors in both cases with respect to that side. In turn, we use this partition (where non-empty) to indicate how the partition is used in determining the outcome relative to the current case based on the decision in the precedent case, which we term the partition bias in CC and which is presented in the column labeled Biases Decision For.
Using these factors, cases, and case comparison method, we can provide selected case comparisons as in Table 7 . We see in the case comparison Restrict/Vanilla, where Restrict is the current case and Vanilla is the PC, that Vanilla can be used as a PC (P1 and P2 are not empty), while P3 are P factors in favour of deciding the current case for P in Restrict, but P5 are D factors in favour of deciding the current case for D. In the ontology presented below, we do not consider how these partitions are weighed in coming to a decision on the CC. Consider each of the partitions. Recall that we are examining for the moment only PCs which were decided for P; case comparisons which use PCs decided for D follow very similar reasoning, but give rise to different patterns.
-We say that P1 and P2 bias the decision for P in CC because these are factors which appeared in PCi as well. PCi was a case in which P won. Ceteris paribus, as for PCi so for CC, so P should win in CC as well. -P3 biases the decision for P in CC since it says that there are more P factors in CC than in PCi, which was won by P. -P4 biases the decision for P in CC since it says that there are fewer D factors in CC than in PCi. Since P won in PC with more D factors, then it makes sense that P ought to win in a CC which as fewer D factors. -P5 biases the decision for D in CC because there are more D factors in CC than in PCi. Perhaps if these factors had been present in PCi, P would not have won. -P6 biases the decision in favour of P in CC since though CC has fewer P factors that PCi, P won in PCi, so unless there are reasons otherwise, we can take this precedent to support CC as well.
A partition in a case comparison only biases the decision and does not determine it since the decision depends on the other partitions and how we reason with them. For example, suppose CC and PCi have exactly the same sets of factors and PCi was decided for P; therefore, we would say that CC should be decided for P as well. On the other hand for some other relevant precedent case, PCj, where P5 is not empty (i.e. there are some D factors in CC not in PCj), we cannot use the decision in PCj to decide in favour of P in CC.
To give a flavour of how reasoning in AS-CATO makes use of factors, cases, partitions, and case comparisons, we give a very simple example of the reasoning in AS-CATO using argument schemes to express our example of an argument based on a precedent. We use three schemes. The first scheme requires three premises to hold and an exception not to hold (we overlook the exception for the moment): If P1 is non-empty, P2 is non-empty, and P1 was preferred to P2 in PC, then we conclude that we can decide CC for P. P1 and P2 are given. The preference must be argued for with a scheme that has three premises and an exception (which we again overlook): If P1 is non-empty, P2 is non-empty, and PC was decided for P in CC, then we conclude that P1 was preferred to P2 in PC. Finally, we can strengthen the current case with the following argument: If P3 is non-empty, then decide CC for P. Other argument schemes, including those which argue for an exception, depend on what partitions hold or the relationships between factors in the partitions. These are relevant with respect to the intermediate concepts. The argument schemes in Wyner and Bench-Capon (2007) are designed to reason through all these cases of interactions of the partitions. However, a full presentation of the argument schemes themselves is outside the scope of this paper.
Intermediate concepts in AS-CATO
Let us turn to consider the role of intermediate concepts in AS-CATO. In AS-CATO, the only role for abstract factors is to argue about distinctions between the CC and a given PCi. Thus, abstract factors play the role in CATO of reasoning about the significance of distinctions among cases. There are two argument schemes AS3 and AS4. We consider just AS3, which claims that PCi cannot be used to argue for P in CC where there are P factors in PCi not in CC (i.e. partition P6). However, there are two exceptions, which if they hold, undermine this claim. We discuss just one-Substituting P3 Factors Exception-using the P3 partition, which are the P factors in CC that are not in PCi. This exception holds that if for every factor x in P6, there is some factor y in P3, and x and y have the same abstract factor. The logic is that though the particular P factor y in PCi is not in CC, there is some other P factor x in CC which, in effect, plays the same ''role'' in the cases. We see this in the case comparison Deceit/Bribe,where Deceit contains the P factor F26 Deception, while Bribe contains the P factor F2 BribeEmployee. F2 and F26 have as common parent F111 Questionable-Means. Thus, though Bribe has a P factor not in Deceit, we can still use Bribe as an argument for P in CC since, in effect, F2 and F26 are comparable. Conceptually, the other exceptions in AS3 and AS4 use the abstract factors in this way to compare factors across partitions.
AS-CATO does not, then, use abstract factors to identify issues or to to organise arguments by issues. In particular, AS-CATO presumes that all possible case comparisons are generated and, where there are shared P and D factors, considered. The agenda of AS-CATO is much more focussed-to provide a formalisation of case comparison and case-based reasoning using particular case comparisons. 
The domain model and evaluation procedure in IBP
IBP begins an analysis from the top-down, considering a legal concept trade secret misappropriated, which is implied by two subsidiary concepts info a trade secret and info misappropriated. In turn, these subsidiary concepts are implied by what appear as Legal Issues or Intermediate Legal Concerns from the factors of Aleven (1997) , Brüninghaus and Ashley (2003a) refer to as the issues. The issues are then An ontology in OWL for legal case-based reasoning 375
supported by the Intermediate Legal Concerns or Base-level factors of Aleven (1997) .
5
For P to win a claim that information which was a trade secret has been misappropriated, it must be shown that D misappropriated the information from P and that the information was a trade secret for P. To show that the information was misappropriated, D must have used the information and that information must have been transferred in a confidential relationship between P and D; alternatively, it may be shown that the information was acquired by D using improper means. To show that the information was a trade secret of P, the information must be valuable to P's business and P had to have been taking measures to keep the information secret. To decide the top-level issue for P, the lower level issues must also be decided for P or otherwise distinguished, otherwise IBP abstains from making a decision.
We express these relationships in terms of the following implications, where the topmost goal is the decision for P that a trade secret has been misappropriated: We should note that the levels are levels of intermediate concepts in a logical relation rather than lattice-theoretic structure; by the same token, the levels of IBP do not correlate exactly with the levels in CATO, though the same factors are under consideration.
The Level 3 issues are, in turn, associated with Base-level Factors and the side the base-level factor favours; if the Base-level Factor is present in the case, then the issue must be considered as relevant. We shall assume that the Base-level Factors of Table 2 which have Efforts-To-Maintain-Secrecy as parent are understood to support that Level 3 factor. Thus, we can understand that the Base-level Factors are partitioned according to which Level 3 issues they are relevant to. The partitions are determined irrespective of the current case, unlike AS-CATO, where partitions are calculated when comparing cases.
In general, factors are understood to strengthen or weaken the decision relative to the higher level factor. If all lower level factors uniformly favour a side, then the higher level factor assumes that side as well; if there are mixed sides among the lower level factors, then either the variants can be explained away somehow or IBP abstains from a decision on the higher level issue. If there is an abstention on an issue, then IBP abstains from a decision on the case. 6 In addition, some factors are weak factors, which cannot be used to distinguish an outcome, while other factors are knockout factors, which, if present in a case, can highly predispose the outcome of the case irrespective of other factors in the case and the side they favour.
A case input into IBP follows a series of steps to evaluate an outcome, whether or not the current undecided case is decided in favour of P.
1. Using the domain model and the case factors, identify the relevant Level 3 issues. If a case factor associated with an issue appears in the case, then the issue is relevant. For example, if the factors Nondisclosure-Agreement and Info-Disclosed-Outsiders are found in the case, then the issue Maintain-Secrecy is relevant. 2. If the case has no factors associated with an issue, then that issue is not relevant to the determination of the case, and it is assumed to be decided for the default side. 3. Where there are factors relevant to an issue: a. If all factors favour the same side, the issue is resolved for that side. b. If there are factors favouring both sides, retrieve cases with those factors. If all the retrieved cases favour the same side, the issue is resolved for that side (Theory Testing). c. If the retrieved cases do not all favour the same side, partition the cases into the majority of cases which favour one side and the minority of cases which favour the other side. Explain the minority cases (see Explain Away). In other words, one presumes the majority of cases for one side is the norm and that the minority of cases must have been decided with respect to some other factor which is not relevant to the current case. d. If there are no cases retrieved, broaden the set of retrieved cases (see Broaden). In this instance, the current case is presumed to be more specific than any other case, so one searches for similar cases which are less specific and determines an outcome based on them.
4. To Explain Away, for each retrieved case among the minority cases, identify those factors which distinguish it from the current case. If the factor is a knockout factor, the outcome of that case is attributed to that factor. If the factor is a weak factor, then no outcome can be returned. 5. To Broaden, where there are multiple factors for one side in cases in the retrieved cases, drop each factor in turn and go to step (3b). For example, in arguing for P, suppose that we remove a P factor and by so doing find a case in which the decision favours the P. Then, we presume that the current case, which 6 There is some unclarity about whether Level 1-3 factors are presumed to be decided for one side in the absence of support otherwise. For example, if Info-Valuable is not challenged or raised in the case, then it might be taken to be decided by default for P; there would be no court case were this not so. Similarly, Improper-Means-Conclusion would, if not raised, appear to be presumed to be decided for D; if it is raised, P bears a burden of proof to show that improper means were used. Another option is to assume no defaults, but that the sides must be decided for every higher-level factor. We assume defaults all for P, leaving other issues for future examination.
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is stronger for the P can be decided with respect to a prior case which is weaker. If no cases are returned from broadening or if cases are returned which favour D, then IBP abstains from issuing a decision. 6. Having determined the outcome relative to each issue (if there is one), IBP then determines the overall outcome relative to all the relevant issues and according to the logic of the Domain Model.
Having outlined the main elements of IBP, let us consider the role of the intermediate concepts.
Intermediate concepts in IBP
IBP has two sorts of intermediate concepts, those which are given by logical implication and those which are given by a non-logical relationship. The first sort is found in the logical implications among the Legal Issues and Intermediate Legal Concepts of Levels 1-3. The second is found among the relationship between Level 3 Intermediate Legal Concepts and the Base-level Factors. One way to characterise the distinction is that Levels 1-3 are of Boolean sorts (i.e. bearing truth values), while the Base-level Factors are Non-boolean with respect to their relation to an Intermediate Legal Concept; that is, we say that Base-level Factors hold or not of a case (i.e. are true or false as a proposition of the case), but only ''support'' and not logically imply the truth of an Intermediate Legal Concept. The distinction is not made in Ashley and Brüninghaus (2003) , which is conceptually important.
Intermediate concepts in IBP appear to have two roles. Levels 1-3 represent legal reasoning about cases and case comparisons. Level 3 has another function, which is to limit the cases under consideration to those under the scope of the Level 3 factor. . 1 ), yet makes fewer errors (10 v. 14). So, IBP, which uses concepts, has better performance overall since it considers a narrower domain of cases. In IBP, the Theory-Testing step only considers those cases from the case-base which share all the factors relative to an issue, rather than all cases which share all features absolutely, as in IBP-No-Issues. IBP focusses on a subset of cases, coming to a decision relative to the issue; IBP-No-Issues may consider cases which cannot be decided, so it abstains. The main role, then, of the issues is not a logical issue (as it would appear in discussions of the logical representation) but a performance issue related to constraining the alternative cases under consideration, which in turn do not return a result in favour of one side. In IBP, intermediate concepts serve a function much along the lines found in enabling legislation and case law decisions as discussed in Sect. 2. When we turn to providing the ontologies for these systems, we focus on the objects and their properties rather than how we reason with them. The argument schemes of AS-CATO and the logic of issues of IBP are, therefore, not part of the ontology.
LCBR ontologies in OWL
Having outlined two approaches to LCBR and identified the key concepts we address, we provide their underlying ontologies. Our presentation is schematic in the sense that we indicate the classes and their main properties and relations. However, given our focus on the extracting an ontology in the course of analysis of different LCBR systems, we do not present the full OWL ontology as developed in Prote´ge´.
7 Moreover, we have broken the presentation into subsections in order to explain the elements in each.
Four components of the ontology are common to both approaches: names, parties, factors, and cases; these comprise a core ontology for LCBR. AS-CATO has two additional classes for partitions and case comparisons. IBP has a class for issues. The classes are mutually disjoint. We discuss each of these classes and their properties and relations. Each class may be comprised of subclasses and have asserted conditions, which relate instances of one class to instances of another class.
Subclasses inherit the conditions which hold of every member of the superclass, but may otherwise be distinguished according to other conditions. We start with the less complex classes, then work up to the more complex classes which use the simpler classes. All the classes and subclasses are mutually disjoint.
Joint classes
We first present the classes that AS-CATO and IBP have in common.
Names
We have a class of Names which has four subclasses FactorID, FactorName, CaseComparisonID, and CaseID. FactorID refers to a particular factor, while FactorName gives more informative content. As an instance, if we have a FactorName such as Public Disclosure, meaning that this is a factor in some case, we would give it a FactorID such as F12 in order to abbreviate a reference to it. Every Case has a CaseID, which is just some way to refer to the particular cases. Similarly, when we come to making case comparisons between a CC and a PC, then each comparison has a CaseComparisonID to label it. At the bottom level, classes are said to have instances of that class. We read Fig. 1 from the bottom up as, for example, the class of instances which are FactorIDs is a subclass of the class of Names . The subclasses are mutually disjoint, meaning there can be no instances which are both a FactorID and a CaseID.
Parties
In Fig. 2 , we have the class of Party with three subclasses Plaintiff, Defendant, and Unknown. The first two are clear. Unknown is needed for CCs, which are cases that have not yet been decided in for P or D. 
Factors
In Fig. 3 , we have the Factor class with the asserted conditions. We read from the factor class (the first row) to the property and then an instance of some other class (in another other row). In this figure, we include all the conditions that are found for some or all subclasses as we specify below for alternative ontologies. For example, every instance of a Factor must have a FactorID, a FactorName as well as a FactorSide which is an instance of some Party. Subclasses inherit the conditions which hold of the superclass, though additional conditions or restrictions on inherited conditions may apply. The Factor Hierarchy we present in a subsequent section.
Cases
In Fig. 4 , we have a class Case and two subclasses PrecedentCase and CurrentCase. Every case has all the properties, so every case has a Case Defendant which is a Defendant party, a CasePlaintiff which is a Plaintiff party, a CaseDecisionFor some element of Party, a set of CaseFactors, and a CaseID. The subclass CurrentCase has a CaseDecisionFor the Unknown party, while the subclass PrecedentCase has a CaseDecisionFor either the Defendant or the Plaintiff party, but not the Unknown party.
Case comparisons
Our final class appears in Fig. 5 . It has no subclasses and draws on all the other classes. There is a CaseComparisonDecisionFor some Party (which presumably can be Unknown if no decision is made), a CaseComparisonID, a CurrentCase and PrecedentCase, which are the cases that are used in making the case comparison.
Classes for AS-CATO
In this section, we have the classes for partitions of factors and case comparisons which are particular to AS-CATO. AS-CATO inherits the following classes from the joint classes: Name, Party, Factor, and case Case. The Factor class adds asserted conditions to model a Factor Hierarchy.
Factors
In the classes for the joint classes, we did not introduce the Factor Hierarchy, which we do in Fig. 6 
Case comparisons
Case comparison for AS-CATO is a subclass of the case comparison for joint classes, adding the assertion CaseComparisonPartitions, which are the partitions of factors generated by comparing the current case and precedent case.
Classes for IBP
IBP inherits the classes for Name, Party, Case, and CaseComparison. It modifies the class for Factor. There is no class for partitions (Fig. 8) . 
Factors
We distinguish two classes of factors-the Base-level Factors and the three higher level factors (i.e. Levels 1-3). While the logical structure of the Domain Model is outside the ontology, which concerns classes of objects and their properties, not their implicational relationships, which are part of the rule system imposed on the objects. The Base-level Factors ''support'' Level 3 factors, which is specified here in terms of a parent-child relationship; note that this representation does not indicate clearly that only Base-level and Level 3 factors are in a parent-child relationship, though this is expressed in Prote´ge´. In addition, Base-level Factors have a strength, which the other factors do not.
Reasoning
In our presentation, we have focussed on the ontology as the representation of knowledge about LCBR, giving the classes, properties, and relations. We have not been concerned with how this knowledge is used in reasoning. In our view, there are two sides to reasoning in LCBR. In one side, there is reasoning given a case base and a presumed ontology. For example, in Sect. 3.2, we provided a sample output of AS-CATO, given a case base to which the argument schemes are applied; in this output, we infer from the case base to a decision, which is a primary goal of any LCBR system. Further discussion of such reasoning can be found in the literature discussed in Sect. 3. In this paper, we have not focussed on such reasoning.
In the other side, there is reasoning within the ontology. In this area, we can apply any of the reasoning facilities that are possible on OWL ontologies depending on the logical capacities one wants to make use of Sattler (2007) and Antoniou and van Harmelen (2004, p. 152) . OWL can be viewed as a specialisation of predicate logic which allows inference of subclasses, superclasses, classes meeting specified properties, as well as complex queries on the truth or falsity of expressions based on the terms of the ontology. In this paper, we have focussed on the development of LCBR ontologies derived from LCBR systems; given an ontology in OWL, the reasoning facilities are supported. As LCBR systems do not provide OWL ontologies and there are no precedents, we cannot compare reasoning in our ontologies to others.
Future work
Our research on ontologies for LCBR has been largely theoretical in the sense that the focus was on developing ontologies with respect to LCBR systems rather than their application or concrete instantiation. A next step would be to make our LCBR ontologies available on the Internet as well as to instantiate ontologies using them. In this way, our theoretical approach could be tested against the empirical requirements of users such as lawyers in actual case based reasoning. Along the same lines, we would conduct experiments on inferences in the ontologies.
In Sect. 3, we discussed in depth several LCBR systems, emphasising elements to incorporate into an ontology. Given our specific proposals, it remains to be examined what additional components of these LCBR systems could be incorporated as additional aspects of an ontology.
We intend to examine the issues raised at the onset about the relationship between modeling cases and LCBR by comparing and contrasting alternative ontological models of cases and LCBR; presumably, they would be aligned and related as well as generalised into an upper-level ontology in OWL for LCBR. We will investigate further instantiations of the ontologies relative to more concrete case-bases. We will continue to investigate the role of intermediate legal concepts. Furthermore, we want to consider how to extend the method of case comparison beyond the legal domain to other issues in case-based reasoning.
Conclusion
We have provided two ontologies in OWL for LCBR, relating both to a common source. It contributes to understanding the relationship between modeling LCBR and modeling cases. We have made progress towards several of the objectives outlined in Bench-Capon and Visser (1996) . Domain knowledge (i.e. the ontology) is distinguished from the rules which apply to them found in Wyner and BenchCapon (2007) . Giving an explicit, formal, and general conceptualisation of the LCBR domain, we have a clearer understanding of the elements and properties. The faults of the conceptualisation should be easier to identify; one can easily compare and contrast this ontology with alternatives expressed in the same language. The model is easy to maintain, develop, and reuse. It is also very accessible to the legal expert who is not familiar with formal modeling as familiar structures and relationships are apparent. Furthermore, one can ask questions about the model that are intuitive. We have also narrowly constrained our model to those objects most directly relevant to LCBR. In addition to these longstanding objectives, the ontology is provided in OWL, so can be made publically available and used as the basis of a markup language. Using Prote´ge´to develop the language, we can use the reasoning facilities to check that our model is consistent and to generate inferred classes.
